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Abstract
People often engage human-interaction schemas in human-robot interactions, so notions 
of prototypicality are useful in examining how interactions’ formal features shape percep-
tions of social robots. We argue for a typology of three higher-order interaction forms (social, 
task, play) comprising identifiable-but-variable patterns in agents, content, structures, out-
comes, context, norms. From that ground, we examined whether participants’ judgments 
about a social robot (mind, morality, and trust perceptions) differed across prototypical 
interactions. Findings indicate interaction forms somewhat influence trust but not mind 
or morality evaluations. However, how participants perceived interactions (independent 
of form) were more impactful. In particular, perceived task interactions fostered functional 
trust, while perceived play interactions fostered moral trust and attitude shift over time. 
Hence, prototypicality in interactions should not consider formal properties alone but must 
also consider how people perceive interactions according to prototypical frames.
Keywords: social cognition, trust, schema, framing, prototypicality, playfulness,  
temporality
Introduction
News and popular media depict potentials for social robots (embodied technologies that 
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humans. Those interactions comprise distinct orientations, dynamics, and outcomes that 
may fundamentally influence humans’ understandings of robots. In particular, since spe-
cific interactions may be understood as prototypical of common interaction types, people 
may draw on scripts or schema inherent to those forms when evaluating social robots. 
To better understand how interaction types may shape perceptions of robots, we draw on 
human communication literature to argue for an organizing framework of higher-order 
interaction forms and their prototypical features. We employ this framework to isolate the 
particular features of relational norms and aims and to empirically examine their influence 
on social perceptions of a robot. 
Thus, the goals of this research are twofold: to (a) conceptualize interactions as proto-
typical of interaction forms and (b) investigate those forms’ impact on robot perceptions. 
To these ends, we explicate the notion of prototypicality and how it emerges in interactions, 
and then argue for three higher-order interaction forms (social, task, play) comprising dis-
tinct sets of commonly co-occurring features. On that foundation, we present hypothe-
sis and formulate questions regarding interaction forms’ impacts on key social(-cognitive) 
evaluations of robots. After reporting experiment results, findings are discussed in relation 
to prior research on robot schemas, interactants’ individual frames for interaction forms, 
and temporality of social perceptions. Findings indicate that mind perception and moral 
judgment did not vary across interaction forms; trust differed mildly across manipulated 
interaction forms, but more strongly across perceived interaction forms, suggesting proto-
typicality is a matter of both formal and perceived properties.
Literature Review
Human communication scholarship indicates that individual-, group-, and societal-level 
differences can influence how meaning is made in communication processes. In order to 
find superordinate patterns that permit generalizable ideas about how communication 
unfolds, scholars often rely on the notion of prototypicality. Prototypicality is the extent to 
which an exemplar is a good representation of its category (Rosch, 1973). This tautological 
definition belies the construct’s dynamic nature as prototypicality relies on frequencies of 
exemplar encounters and perceptions of each exemplar’s representativeness (Nedungadi & 
Hutchinson, 1985). In other words, the more people encounter an exemplar and perceive 
it as representative of a category, the more likely that exemplar will emerge as prototypical 
of the category.
It may be tempting to consider prototypical exemplars, then, as comprising clear sets 
of features. For instance, one might say an interaction is “professional” if it has necessary 
features of formality, hierarchical relations, and workplace context. However, prototypi-
cality in communication is better considered as having fuzzy-set criteria: an exemplar’s 
representativeness of a category varies with the degree to which it adheres to a collection 
of sufficient-but-not-necessary qualities (see Ragin, 2000). Thus, a “professional” inter-
action is instead one that is sufficiently formal, hierarchical, and/or workplace-situated. 
Non-prototypicality would equate to “0” and perfect prototypicality would equate to “1,” 
with grades between. Although prototypicality is principally examined in individuals’ 
perceptions of other people, the notion is a useful conceptual starting point for forms of 
interaction.
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Prototypicality in Interaction 
Prototypicality emerges through systematically shared features (Nedungadi & Hutchinson, 
1985) that cumulatively guide people’s shared understanding of the world. Accordingly, 
specific interaction forms (i.e., higher-order categories) may be identified by considering 
features that commonly co-occur when agents interact in exemplar interactions. Identify-
ing such features is perhaps best grounded in a long-standing definition of communication: 
Who says What to Whom in which Channel with what Effect (Lasswell, 1948). Who(m) 
refers to the agents involved, What is the content of the messages, Channel includes the 
structural features of an interaction, and Effect is the outcome. As all communication is 
embedded in social situations governed by contextual factors and social rules (Goffman, 
1964), we add to the Lasswellian formula context and norms. Higher-order interaction 
forms can be identified, then, by common agents, content, structures, outcomes, context, 
and norms. Specific interactions are more or less prototypical of those forms as they are 
more or less adherent to the common features.
These six clusters of interaction features set the scope for further explicating systematic 
feature co-occurrence (see Figure 1). There is systematicity in agents in terms of their “kind,” 
where kind is discernible in demographics (e.g., gender expression), social category (e.g., 
blue-collar workers), or ontological category (e.g., robots; Guzman, 2020). Systematicity in 
content includes feature patterns in the subject matter and topic of interactions (Taboada & 
Wiesemann, 2010). Systematicity in structures comprise the composition of messages (How 
does an interaction unfold?) and channels (How is an interaction arranged?). Systematicity 
in outcomes is broadly construed as the individually or jointly (un)expected or (un)desired 
results of an interaction, such as goals (Homans, 1961) and effects (Altman & Taylor, 1973). 
Systematicity in context consists of the spatial and social environments (Bronfenbrenner, 
1977). Finally, systematicity in norms are implicit or explicit social rules for how individuals 
have or ought to behave in an acceptable fashion (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).
Agents Content Structure Context NormsOutcomes
Interaction Form





















FIGURE 1 Formal and Operational Layers of a Model  
for Interaction-Form Prototypicality
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Higher-Order Interaction Forms: Social, Task, Play
We have argued that six clusters of features have subsets that commonly co-occur across 
interaction exemplars. These co-occurrence patterns give rise to higher-order interaction 
forms—akin to how others have proposed operational user-agent interaction “cases” (e.g., 
deception, coercion) based on technical parameters choices, learning; Burr et al., 2018). 
We build on the notion of interaction-form prototypicality to argue for higher-order forms 
across which those cases (and others) may manifest. Prompted by exploratory work suggest-
ing differential social-cognitive effects across social, task, and playful interactions (Banks, 
2017), literature regarding those three interactions suggests variably co-occurring features 
and so candidacy as higher-order interaction forms.
Social interaction. Social interactions, broadly, are processes by which agents co-act 
(Mele, 2017). Under this definition, most interaction exemplars may be considered social. 
However, we refer specifically to interactions in which sociality is an end in itself. Co- 
occurring features manifest in relation to agents (widely varied, but generally of comparable 
power; Dahl, 1957), content (self- and other-relevant subjects such as life stories and opin-
ions; see Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003), structures (reciprocity, turn-taking, increasing self- 
disclosures; Rubin & Shenker, 1978), outcomes (feelings of relatedness, closeness, familiar-
ity, kinship; Aron et al., 1992), context (often third places or personal spaces during leisure 
time; Oldenburg, 2007), and norms (manners, attention, role-taking; Kurth, 1970). 
Task interaction. Task interactions are those constellated around exertion of mental or 
physical resources, primarily in service of an interested entity (Burke, 1971). That interested 
entity may be oneself (a person training for a marathon with an AI coach), another (an elec-
trician working for a homeowner) or an external entity (one performing cooperative labor 
for an employing company). Co-occurring features manifest in relation to agents (actors 
with complementary skill sets and authorities, generally motivated toward mutual benefit; 
see Cummings & Kiesler, 2008), content (goal- and process-relevant subjects; see Picker-
ing & Garrod, 2006), structures (standardized communication protocols, efficient channels, 
established timelines for repeated contact; Bolton, 2015), outcomes (achievement of the aim, 
feelings of competence, rewards for performance; Weiss & Kahn, 1960), context (co-located 
or mediated work spaces, hierarchical social structures; Poole, 1978), and norms (shared or 
tiered responsibility, distribution of roles, collaboration; Teh et al., 2012).
Play interaction. Playful interactions are autotelic communications situated outside of 
(albeit in relation to) everyday work or social life (cf. Huizinga, 1949). Although the notion 
of play may invoke strong associations with games (i.e., [semi-]structured challenge sys-
tems with negotiable outcomes; Juul, 2005), playful interactions also include other autotelic 
communicative activities (e.g., those in leisure, work, education, or culture; Frissen et al., 
2015) situated within a collectively pretended, superimposed system of rules (Frasca, 2007) 
and characterized by a mindset of gregariousness, frivolity, and reduced inhibition (see 
Barnett, 2007). Co-occurring features manifest in relation to agents (familiars with shared 
justification for the activity; Deterding, 2018), content (subjects related to the activity itself 
or communication that is silly, whimsical, funny, or teasing; Mäyrä, 2012), structures (game- 
or participant-defined frameworks for collaboration, competition, or creation; Boyan & 
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Banks, 2018), outcomes (hedonic and eudaimonic gratifications; Rogers et al., 2017), context 
(private spaces or formalized public play spaces; see Foucault, 1986), and norms (e.g., accor-
dance with or free from rules or boundaries, suspension of disbelief; Burke, 1971).
Interaction Forms and Social Perceptions of Robots
Social, task, and play interaction forms afford a tentative typology, and specific interaction 
exemplars (i.e., given conversations) variably fit into the higher-order categories based on 
adherence to some number of sufficient-but-not-necessary features. In this way, the forms 
are concrete enough to discern across more or less prototypical exemplars but still flexi-
ble enough to shift with emergent communication activities. Some exemplars are clearly 
and largely prototypical of an interaction form (most/all common features, closer to full 
prototypicality of “1”) while others have some degree of fit depending on the number of 
representative features (some features, prototypicality between 0 and 1). For instance, con-
sidering playful interactions, a robot playing soccer with a human in a park fits many afore-
mentioned features for prototypical play interactions; however, the same pair playing in a 
grocery store has lesser fit (as the context is not prototypical). This concrete-yet-flexible 
typology is useful for systematically exploring the influence of interactions—as complex 
feature-sets—on relational outcomes.
Prototypicality informs individuals’ schemas and frames that guide their expectations 
for an interaction. Schemas are “superordinate knowledge structures that reflect abstracted 
commonalities across multiple experiences,” shaping how people interpret new experiences 
(Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017, p. 618). Individually held frames are schema-derived filters that 
organize immediate experiences (Goffman, 1974) and serve as interpretive lenses (Scheufele, 
2000). In other words, sets of features held together in each higher-order interaction form 
are—through experience-derived schemas and frames—familiar and recognizable, guiding 
how people approach novel-but-familiar interactions. 
Prototypical social, task, and play interactions foster evolving schemas that include 
descriptive and procedural scripts as each is encountered in everyday life. Scripts are 
abstract representations of stereotypical event-sequences, accessed in response to relevant 
situational cues (Abelson, 1981): sets of ideas about what one and others should do in a 
situation. People engage in similar social-cognitive processes (e.g., mind perception; Banks, 
2020b) and interaction scripts (Edwards et al., 2016) when interacting with robots, though 
it is yet unclear whether the form of an interaction may influence these dynamics. In con-
sidering those potential effects, it is useful to first explore impacts on fundamental social 
judgments in relation to prototypical norms and outcomes. 
Mind perception. People’s perception of another agent as having a mind unfolds through an 
inferential mechanism (Theory of Mind; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) by which they overtly 
or indirectly surmise the agent’s mental states from discernible cues. Three perceived men-
tal capacities (Malle, 2019) are (a) reality-interaction capacity (mindful communication and 
action), (b) affective capacity (physiologically/emotionally experiencing emotional states), 
and (c) social-moral capacity (simulation of others’ minds and evaluating right/wrong). 
Social action often automatically promotes inferences of mindedness and since humans 
generally mentalize robots as they do humans (Banks, 2020a), making it likely that all three 
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interaction forms will promote some level of all three capacities, albeit with differential 
patterns. Because social interactions are grounded in self-relevant exchanges via norms for 
self-disclosure that engender relational intimacy outcomes (Altman & Taylor, 1973), 
(H1a) social interaction will promote highest perceived affective capacity. Task 
interactions feature shared responsibility and cooperation norms (Wageman & 
Baker, 1997) leading to incremental progress and effective task achievement out-
comes (Walliser et al., 2019), such that 
(H1b) task interaction will promote strongest reality-interactive mentalizing. 
With norms for fair play (cf. Consalvo, 2009a) and outcomes of coordination- 
driven achievement and positive affect (Oliver et al., 2015), 
(H1c) playful interactions will promote highest perceived social-moral capac-
ities. Because this indirect mental inferencing operates independently of more 
conscious judgments, it is also useful to consider: 
(RQ1) Does explicit mind ascription differ across interaction forms?
Moral evaluation. Perception of entities’ moral agency is key to a range of social cognitions 
(Moll et al., 2008) that may influence human-machine communication. Extrapolating from 
scholarship on media representations of morality, people show greater affinity for personas 
that express valued moral-character qualities (Tamborini et al., 2013) and desire punish-
ment for those that deviate (Zillmann & Cantor, 1976). Such moral evaluations may vary 
by interaction form, as a form’s prototypical features make salient the behaviors considered 
normatively “good” in an interaction and the types of outcomes that excuse “bad” behaviors. 
For instance, robots telling lies to humans in social interactions may be seen as immoral 
due to expectations for authenticity but found acceptable or desirable in play interactions 
where lies are prototypical (e.g., “poker faces”). 
In addition to discrete moral-character evaluations, explicit moral status ascription 
(overt decision on robots’ abilities to be or do good/bad) may vary across interaction forms. 
An interaction form’s prototypical norms and outcomes may give the human partner greater 
license for acknowledging moral status. However, because moral evaluations depend heav-
ily on the content of messages conveyed, behaviors performed, and people’s emotional 
responses to it (Avramova & Inbar, 2013), neutral content (as in the present study’s stimuli) 
could also prevent variation. Given these conflicting potentials, we ask: 
(RQ2) (How) does robot (a) character evaluation and (b) moral-status ascrip-
tion differ across interaction forms?
Trust(worthiness). Trust is a multifaceted construct understood as a weak induction (some-
where between full knowing and ignorance) that provokes surrender in the face of uncer-
tainty (Simmel, 1908/1950, 1900/1990). Within human-machine communication research 
it is defined as feelings of faith and reliance that a robot will not exploit one’s vulnerability, 
and it is understood as key to social acceptance of robots (see Ullman & Malle, 2018) as it 
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may play out in socioemotional distancing and intentions to engage them. Although extant 
literature suggests playfulness may be associated with positive engagement (Moon & Kim, 
2001), a robot’s performance may affect explicit ascription of trust (van den Brule et al., 
2014), and linguistics may influence social distance (Kim et al., 2013). However, it is yet 
unclear whether higher-order interaction forms may engender differences in trust. There-
fore, we ask: 
(How) do (RQ3a) explicit trust ascription and (RQ3b) trust-related intentions 
(i.e., future engagement and preferred social distance) vary across interaction 
forms?
In social judgments of robots, trust as a feeling-state is different from trustworthiness 
as the perception of another actor’s abilities or character (Colquitt et al., 2007). Robot trust-
worthiness is multidimensional (Ullman & Malle, 2019), comprising considerations of 
capacity (whether a robot is functionally capable and operationally reliable) and morality 
(whether it is inherently ethical and sincere). We predict that both types of trustworthi-
ness will vary by interaction form. As social interactions rely on norms of authentic self- 
disclosure and outcomes of relational closeness (Altman & Taylor, 1973) and play interac-
tions rely on norms of rule-following and fairness (Consalvo, 2009a), we hypothesize that 
(H2a) social and play interactions will promote highest levels of moral trustwor-
thiness. Regarding capacity trustworthiness, competence is known to precede 
trust in another’s capabilities (Sherwood & DePaolo, 2005) and capacity trust-
worthiness manifests partly through cooperative decision-making (McCabe et 
al., 2001), which is common to both task and play interactions. Following, it is 
likely that in comparison to social interactions, 
(H2b) task and play interactions will promote highest capacity trustworthiness 
perceptions. 
Method
The study implemented three exemplars prototypical of the three higher-order interaction 
forms (social, task, play) as a between-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of these conditions, resulting in n = 40 participants in the social condition, n = 38 
in the task condition, and n = 39 in the play condition. All study materials are available in 
online supplements: https://osf.io/n87bg/.
Participants
A convenience sample of students was invited to participate in a study on “interacting with 
robots in different situations” for course credit and US$5 compensation. After excluding 
three participants due to technical issues, impaired vision, and missing survey responses, 
the final sample comprised 117 participants aged M = 20.38 years (SD = 3.45, range: 18–40). 
In total, 43 participants identified as male and 74 as female. Ethnicities included Caucasian 
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(n = 75), Hispanic (n = 19), African (n = 9), Asian (n = 6), native American (n = 1), and 
mixed ethnicities (n = 7).
Procedure
The study’s procedure consisted of three stages. First, participants completed a pre-session 
online survey capturing covariates: robot experience, existing robot and technology atti-
tudes, and demographics. 
Second, they participated in an in-person lab session to complete the robot-interac-
tion procedure (see supplements for lab configuration). After giving informed consent, the 
experimenter guided participants into another room and briefly introduced them to the 
humanoid robot “Ray” (RoboThespian with “Pris” face and “Heather” American English 
voice, addressed with female pronouns); they were given the chance to introduce them-
selves. The experimenter briefly left the room as they “got to know each other” to minimize 
immediate novelty effects; Ray asked participants about academic majors, current studies, 
and hobbies, followed by a short description of Ray’s alleged leisure activities (“reading the 
news on the internet”). The experimenter then stepped back into the room and provided 
instructions for the assigned interaction that would unfold (sans experimenter) over the 
next 5 minutes. 
Finally, after those 5 minutes, the experimenter returned and led the participant back 
to the first room to complete a post-interaction survey out of sight of both robot and exper-
imenter. That survey included items capturing initial impression of Ray and of the inter-
action, and scales for perceptions of mind, morality, and trust. Participants were thanked, 
compensated, and dismissed.
Stimulus Interactions
The robot was controlled using Wizard of Oz methodology: although we told participants 
that Ray could “do a lot of things, like sensing its environment, listening and responding 
in conversations,” the robot was fully controlled from a hidden lab room. One of three stu-
dent assistants controlled Ray using 36 pre-defined interaction scripts consisting of verbal 
and non-verbal responses—including affirmatives (e.g., “Oh, very good.”), negatives (e.g., 
“No, I don’t think so.”), and ambiguous statements (e.g., “Interesting.”), as well as several 
condition-specific responses. A cover story rationalized limitations when participants 
wanted to talk with Ray beyond the predetermined script, explaining that Ray was still 
“learning how to speak to humans well,” that some “speech may be a little limited,” and they 
should not “be surprised if she doesn’t give the perfect answer to what you say.” The control-
lers were trained for 6 hours and ran tests with naive training participants. Form features 
associated with agents, structures, content, and context were controlled while prototypical 
features for norms and outcomes were manipulated (Table 1; see supplements for complete 
scripts and stimuli).
Social interaction. In the social condition, participants engaged in “friendly conversation” 
with Ray about everyday triangle-shaped things (a morally neutral topic). Instructions 
emphasized self-disclosures through talk about everyday experiences. Both interlocutors 
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were instructed to use a keyboard to type out topics discussed (typing was shown via Mic-
rosoft Word on a wall-mounted screen) to visibly display Ray’s agency in parallel with 
on-screen activities in other conditions. Ray’s condition-specific speech included requests 
to name triangles, think about a favorite triangle, explain an unfamiliar triangle, and spec-
ulate about triangles’ importance. 
Task interaction. In the task condition, participants “completed a task together” with 
Ray: cooperating on a CAPTCHA-like task to find hidden triangles in photographs. 
Instructions emphasized coordination and accuracy as goal outcomes. Ray’s actions were 
shown on-screen by a moving cursor and clicking identified triangles. Ray’s condition- 
specific speech included task-relevant suggestions, action narrations, and requests for help. 
Play interaction. In the play condition, participants were asked to “play a game” with Ray. 
The game was DeRu (InkKit, 2018): a puzzle game in which players cooperate to navigate 
triangles through obstacles to respective goal states. Instructions outlined game rules, goals, 
and emphasized turn-taking and having fun. Ray’s actions were shown on-screen through 
the control of the triangle game piece, and condition-specific speech included movement 
suggestions and narratives of actions.
Measures
All within-scale items responses were presented in a randomized order on 7-point Likert 
scales and averaged by subscale for further statistical analyses, unless otherwise indicated.
TABLE 1 Interaction Form Features Manipulated and Held Constant Across Conditions
Social Task Play
Agents Human students interacting with a female-cued robot who speaks, gestures, 
and indicates agency on-screen
Content “What things in your 
life are shaped like 
triangles?”
“identifying hidden  
triangle shapes in 
complex photographs”
“control a triangle  
and . . . get the triangle 
into its home”
Structure Turn-taking, self-disclosure, vocal messaging, exhibition of action on-screen, 
escalating complexity/difficulty
Outcomes “get to know each other” “accuracy in identifying 
triangles”
“having fun”
Context Sterile lab setting (across a table from Ray, with wall-mounted screen and 
keyboard/gamepad controls), with the interaction framed in the service of 
research




“complete a task 
together,” “accuracy,” 
specific instructions
“play a game together,” 
beating levels, challenge 
and achievement signals
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Mind perception. Participants were asked to complete the updated 20-item version of the 
multidimensional mental capacity scale (Malle, 2019) comprising three dimensions: reali-
ty-interaction capacity (α = .86), affective capacity (α = .86), and social/moral capacity (α = 
.86). Participants also rated the robot on the four-item dependency (i.e., mindlessness) sub-
scale of the perceived moral agency scale (α = .53; Banks, 2019) and were asked to explic-
itly indicate whether or not “Ray has a mind” (no/yes). Due to low internal reliability, the 
dependency subscale was excluded from further analyses.
Moral evaluation. The perceived moral agency scale’s six-item moral-capacity subscale (α 
= .89; Banks, 2019) was employed, complemented by the extended character morality ques-
tionnaire (Grizzard et al., 2020) consisting of four-item moral-foundation subscales: care (α 
= .85), fairness (α = .77), loyalty (α = .77), authority (α = .88), purity (α = .69). The purity 
subscale was adapted (in cooperation with the scale developer), replacing one item about 
smoking with one about a computer virus. Two items were dropped from analysis (“healthy 
lifestyle” from the purity set, “loyalty to friends” from the loyalty set) for low intra-dimen-
sion correlations (r ≤ –.02). Explicit moral status was measured by asking whether or not 
“Ray can be moral or immoral” (no/yes).
Trust(worthiness). Participants’ trust in Ray was operationalized as both trustworthi-
ness and trust-related intentions. Trustworthiness was captured via the multidimensional 
measure of trust (Ullman & Malle, 2019) with two dimensions: capacity trustworthiness 
(α = .85) and moral trustworthiness (α = .91). Participants also responded to a single 
dichotomous measure, asking “whether or not they trust Ray” (no/yes). Trust-related inten-
tions were captured via two measures concerning comfort with future interactions. First, 
physical, relational, and conversational indicators of social distance were employed using 
three Guttman-scale items (Banks & Edwards, 2019), range 0–6 with lower scores indicat-
ing more distance. Second, participants indicated degrees of willingness to meet with Ray 
again in three different scenarios: “to have a friendly chat,” “to work on a difficult problem,” 
or “to play a game.”
Manipulation check. Although stimulus interactions were carefully constructed according 
to prototypicality criteria, interactions within laboratory settings may be seen as a task in 
itself, irrespective of its features. Following, a single-item manipulation check was used to 
capture perceptions of the interaction as most similar to “having a conversation,” “complet-
ing a task,” or “playing a game.” Participants also were asked to describe their experience in 
an open-ended format.
Control measures. Participants documented attitudes toward robots via the Godspeed 
questionnaire likability subscale (α = .90; Bartneck et al., 2009) and prior experience with 
robots via a single Likert-style item. General attitudes regarding novel technologies were 
captured using technophobia (α = .77) and technophilia scales (α = .88; Martínez-Córcoles 
et al., 2017). Specific to the stimuli, Ray’s perceived humanlikeness and amiability were cap-
tured using the Godspeed anthropomorphism (α = .83) and likeability subscales (α = .88).
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Results
Analyses draw from a sample of N = 117; however, due to survey randomization error, 
the first 44 cases collected were only shown two of three dependent variable sets, so they 
suffer from data missing at random. See supplements for specific missing cases, descriptive 
statistics, and zero-order correlations. In checking effectiveness of the manipulation, par-
ticipants perceived all conditions as most similar to completing a task (see supplements). 
However, Chi-Squared testing across conditions demonstrated that no misaligned percep-
tions were significant (ps ≥ .150). Based on these discrepancies between assigned and per-
ceived interaction form, analyses evaluated both manipulated and perceived interaction 
forms as between-subjects factors.
Hypothesis Testing
In multivariate and univariate tests (as appropriate, given [non]correlations between depen-
dent variables), when significance was approached (p range .051–.100), moderate or larger 
effect sizes (Cramér’s V ≥ .21 [given df = 2] and univariate part. η2 ≥ .06) were interpreted, 
given smaller sample sizes inappropriately punish p values (Bowman, 2017). 
Mind perception (H1a–c, RQ1). MANCOVA compared mental capacities across dimen-
sions; participants’ general technology and robot attitudes and Ray’s perceived humanlike-
ness and amiability were covariates. There was no significant multivariate effect for mental 
capacities, Wilks’ λ = .97, F(6,192) = 0.46, p = .837. Therefore, hypotheses H1a, H1b, and 
H1c were not supported. A Chi-Square test compared explicit mind ascription across con-
ditions, with no significant differences, χ2(2) = 3.08, p = .215, V = .171. Answering RQ1, 
then, explicit mind ascription did not significantly differ across interaction forms.
Moral evaluation (RQ2). A MANCOVA compared moral character and ANCOVA com-
pared moral status across conditions, with the same covariates as above. There was neither 
a significant multivariate effect, λ = .86, F(10,188) = 1.45, p = .161, nor a significant main 
effect, F(2,98) = 1.29, p = .279, part. η2 = .026. Concerning explicit moral-status ascription 
across conditions, analysis again revealed no significant differences, χ2(2) = 0.30, p = .860, 
V = .053. Answering RQ2, neither implicit nor explicit moral evaluations varied across 
manipulated interaction forms.
Trust(worthiness) (H2a–b, RQ3a–b). MANCOVA (with covariates as above) compared 
trustworthiness across conditions. Although there was a significant multivariate effect, λ 
= .87, F(4,194) = 3.44, p = .010, subsequent univariate testing revealed no significant dif-
ferences (capacity trustworthiness: F(2,98) = 2.82, p = .064, part. η2 = .054; moral trust-
worthiness: F(2,98) = 2.94, p = .058, part. η2 = .057), offering no support for H2a or H2b. 
A Chi-Square test comparing trust ascription across conditions indicated differences 
approaching significance and meeting the effect-size benchmark, χ2(2) = 5.31, p = .070, 
V = .224. Participants in the task condition were most likely to explicitly express trust in Ray 
(71.43%) compared to those in the play (57.58%) or social (44.74%) conditions. 
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Concerning trust-related intentions, the three social distance and three intention 
parameters were strongly correlated, warranting MANCOVAs (with covariates as above). 
There was a significant multivariate effect for social distance, λ = .88, F(6,214) = 2.34, 
p = .033. Univariate testing showed a significant effect only for physical distance, 
F(2,109) = 4.86, p = .010, part. η2 = .082. Participants in both task (M = 4.16, SD = 0.92) and play 
(M = 4.08, SD = 1.18) conditions felt more comfortable with being physically near Ray 
than did those in the social condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.65). Concerning participants’ 
willingness to interact with Ray again, there was no significant multivariate effect, λ = .89, 
F(6,214) = 2.04, p = .061. However, univariate testing revealed a significant effect for people’s 
intention to return for a play interaction, F(2,109) = 3.77, p = .026, part. η2 = .065. Mirroring 
the results for physical distance, participants in both task (M = 5.55, SD = 1.57) and play 
(M = 5.79, SD = 1.89) conditions showed stronger willingness compared to those in the 
social condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.98). 
Post-Hoc Analysis: Differences Across Perceived Interaction Forms
Due to discrepancies between assigned and perceived interaction forms, data were re- 
analyzed using perceived interaction form (social [n = 20; 17.09%] vs. task [n = 66; 56.41%] 
vs. play [n = 31; 26.50%]) as a between-subjects factor. This re-analysis used the same sta-
tistical methods as used in the initial analysis, typically robust against unequal group sizes 
(barring homogeneity issues not present here; see supplements).
Mind perception. MANCOVA again showed no significant multivariate effect on three 
mental capacities, λ = .90, F(6,192) = 1.69, p = .126. Thus, no support is offered for H1a–c. 
Conversely, the Chi-square test to check for explicit mind ascription approached signifi-
cance and met the effect-size benchmark, χ2(2) = 5.22, p = .074, V = .222. In contrast to 
manipulated interaction’s null effects (RQ1), participants perceiving a task interaction were 
least likely to ascribe mind (37.29%) compared to the other conditions (play 59.26%, social 
60.00%). 
Moral evaluation. A multivariate effect approached significance and met the effect-size 
benchmark for perceived moral character, λ = .83, F(10,188) = 1.78, p = .067, but there 
were no significant univariate effects for any moral character parameter. No significant 
main effect was found for moral capacity, F(2,98) = 1.24, p = .295, part. η2 = .025. Explicit 
moral-status ascription also did not differ by perceived form, χ2(2) = 4.21, p = .122, V = .199. 
Trust(worthiness). In line with original analysis, there was a multivariate effect for trust-
worthiness, λ = .81, F(4,194) = 5.49, p < .001, and a significant univariate effect for moral 
trustworthiness, F(2,98) = 10.08, p < .001, part. η2 = .171. Those perceiving social interac-
tions scored highest in moral trustworthiness (M = 5.08, SD = 1.10), followed by the play 
(M = 4.50, SD = 1.10) and task groups (M = 4.02, SD = 1.45). There was no difference in 
explicit trust ascription across perceived interaction forms, χ2(2) = 0.02, p = .988, V = .015. 
Thus, re-analysis is interpreted to offer partial support for H2a only when considering per-
ceived interaction forms.
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Regarding social distance, there was no multivariate effect, λ = .94, F(6,214) = 1.10, 
p = .362. However, participants’ openness to future interaction varied across conditions, 
λ = .84, F(6,214) = 3.25, p = .004. A significant univariate effect was exhibited only for will-
ingness to return to play a game with Ray, F(2,109) = 9.78, p < .001, part. η2 = .152. Partic-
ipants perceiving a playful interaction showed greatest willingness (M = 6.42, SD = .89) to 
play again, compared to those perceiving task (M = 5.02, SD = 2.02) and social (M = 5.05, 
SD = 1.88) interactions.
Post-Hoc Analysis: Themes in Interaction Experiences
Although preceding analyses allow for statistical comparisons of measured responses, a 
limitation of this approach is that comparisons are determined a priori. Inductive analysis 
of participants’ open-ended experience descriptions complements findings above by con-
sidering patterns in subjective experiences. Open answers to the post-interaction survey 
question “What was it like to spend time with Ray as you did?” were subjected to inductive 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; see supplements). This analysis extracted three 
themes:
Affective reflections (n = 150 mentions). Participants recounted emotional reactions to 
their own role in the interaction (e.g., “I felt kind of silly talking to a robot”) and/or reflec-
tion of their own emotions felt during the interaction (e.g., “being with Ray did not make 
me feel comfortable”). Some reflections were clear and manifest (e.g., emotion words: angry, 
sad, happy) but others were more complex or latent (e.g., fascination, implications of awe). 
Robot capacities (n = 147). Some responses included mentions of what Ray was possibly or 
actually able to do during interactions in terms of non-physical capacities, including social 
and mental capabilities, but not personality or physical traits or specific behaviors. Men-
tions included (a) interactive capacities, (b) functional capacities, and (c) capacities to act 
or think independently. For instance, some mentioned that “Ray’s response time was slow” 
or that Ray had strong or poor “people skills.”
Temporality (n = 125). Participants also mentioned the role time played in their experi-
ences. These included: (a) (lack of) prior expectations for robots, suggesting before/after 
shifts in mindset (e.g., “I did not know what to expect when I walked in”), (b) mentions 
of how feelings/thoughts changed over the interaction (e.g., “at first, I felt scared”), and 
(c) concrete mentions of time-related concepts (e.g., minutes, a long time passed, or wish-
ing for more time).
Experience themes across forms. To evaluate whether themes were differentially salient 
in specific interaction forms, a coding scheme was developed from the inductive analysis 
results (see supplements) and used in coding for absence/presence of themes. Two inde-
pendent coders achieved interrater reliability on a 10% subset of data: affective α = 1.00, 
capacities α = –.045 (83.3% agreement, acceptable due to infrequent codes; Krippendorff, 
2011), and temporality α = .83. One rater coded the remaining data.
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Across the manipulated interaction-form conditions, there were no significant differ-
ences (ps ≥ .142, ηs2  ≥ .034; see supplements for detailed results). For perceived interac-
tion forms, no difference emerged for the presence of affective reflection, F(2,114) = 2.11, 
p = .126, η2 = .036, or robot capacity, F(2,114) = 0.38, p = .686, η2 = .007. However, mentions 
of temporality differed significantly, F(2,114) = 6.11, p = .003, η2 = .097. Participants who 
perceived game-like interactions were more likely to mention temporal concepts compared 
to those perceiving task-like interactions (ΔM = –.36, SD = .10, p = .003). Notably, not all 
mentions of time were equal; some participants noted time in a strictly factual way (“we 
spent time together”) while others mused (wishing for “more time” with Ray). This analy-
sis did not discriminate among valences or semantics, such that claims here are limited to 
mentions as indications of salience.
Discussion
On the theoretical ground that interactions take three higher-order forms (social, task, play) 
based on prototypical features (agents, norms, structures, content, outcomes, context), we 
predicted and questioned the nature of interaction forms’ influence on social evaluations 
of robots. To summarize, we found no statistically meaningful differences in perceived 
mental or moral evaluations across manipulated interaction forms. However, there was a 
greater tendency to explicitly express trust after task interactions (versus social or play) 
and willingness to be physically closer after task or play interactions. Since perceptions 
of interactions differed from the manipulated form, reanalyzing social judgments for per-
ceived interaction forms again showed no effects on moral capacity evaluations. However, 
explicit mind ascription was less frequently ascribed in perceived-task interactions, moral 
trustworthiness highest in perceived-social interactions, and willingness to return for play-
ful interactions in a perceived-playful interaction. Temporal dynamics were most salient 
to individuals perceiving the interaction as a game. Results indicate (a) likely importance 
of task-form features in promoting trust, (b) divergence of interactions’ formal features 
and individuals’ perceptions thereof, with an influence on trust, and (c) a relative non- 
importance of interaction form for social cognitions.
Task Interactions as Robot Schema-Consistent
The manipulated features of norms and outcomes manifested in the task condition as 
functional cooperation, action and productivity guidelines, and outcome accuracy. Task 
interactions promoted explicit trust and comfort with physical closeness, suggesting its 
prototypical features are more aligned with common mental models for what a robot is (a 
function-driven machine; Banks, 2020a), how it should behave (completing tasks; Takayama 
et al., 2008), and what its skills are (unbiased information processing; Sundar, 2008). This 
schema-consistency may have facilitated a working intuition of how the robot could com-
plete the task, in contrast to a lack of understanding for capacities to socialize or play. In 
other words, when robots do what is ostensibly appropriate for robots to do (i.e., efficient 
work) through normative, discernible mechanisms (i.e., simple input/output loops), people 
may move closer to knowing than not-knowing (cf. Simmel, 1908/1950) and trust them 
more—even to the extent of welcoming them in less task-oriented future interactions. 
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In tandem, participants in the play and social interaction conditions may have formed 
expectations about the robot’s functionality and performance that exceeded its actual capa-
bilities. While its humanoid appearance might have already raised performance expectations 
from the outset (Duffy, 2003), each interaction-form prime may have uniquely emphasized 
different robot functionalities (Lohse, 2011). Some expectations were easier to fulfill during 
the short, pre-scripted scenarios (i.e., purely functional expectations in the task condition) 
than others (i.e., elaborate social-cognitive/socio-emotional expectations in play and social 
conditions). Typically, such expectancy violations result in participant disappointment and 
reduced acceptance of (Komatsu et al., 2012) and trust in robots (Kwon et al., 2016). 
These interpretations point to task interactions as suitable starting points toward more 
social interactions, facilitating utilitarian trust in advance of socioemotional trust (see Van-
neste et al., 2014). By adhering to task-form norms and aims, robot interactions may avoid 
eliciting anxieties typically associated with social (i.e., less schema-consistent) implemen-
tations of embodied artificial intelligence (Cave et al., 2019). Notably, adherence to schema 
(superordinate knowledge structures that shape new experiences; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017) 
may only be applicable to the kinds of novel and short-term interactions in this study. As 
schemas evolve with continuous experience, expectations for interactions may also evolve—
potentially to allow for less structured, more social interactions.
Interaction Forms Versus Interactant Frames
Interaction forms’ influence on trust indicators differed between manipulated and per-
ceived interaction forms. Manipulated task interactions promoted explicit trust ascription 
and acceptance of physical vulnerability, while perceived social engagement promoted 
impressions of moral trustworthiness and perceived playful exchange promoted willing-
ness to play again. This finding suggests trust emerges differentially in relation to actual 
interaction dynamics compared to an individual’s frame (i.e., interpretive lens) toward an 
interaction. Frames are understood to organize people’s immediate experiences by filter-
ing in relevant and filtering out irrelevant information (Goffman, 1974), such that what 
“counts” for trust appears to emerge differently based on perception. Specifically, when an 
interaction is perceived as social it may engender moral trustworthiness through mutual 
self-disclosure (Martelaro et al., 2016); when it is perceived as playful, autotelic engagement 
may engender positive affect toward anticipated future play (cf. Dragan et al., 2014). This 
sits in contrast to the influence of task-interaction formal features as they influenced indi-
cators of less socioemotional and more functional trust orientations. The aims and norms 
associated with tasks (i.e., completion, accuracy, order) appear to have promoted a type of 
operative trust that emphasizes a conscious and overt risk-acceptance orientation. In other 
words, the robot proved it could be effective in task in a co-present context, therefore it is 
likely safe to be around. Speculatively, then, both subjectively felt and practically applied 
trust may be most effectively fostered when an interaction is effectively task-oriented but is 
understood to be social and/or playful.
Play as Transitional Interaction
Participants who perceived their interaction as playful and expressed greatest willingness 
to engage in another playful interaction also described their experiences with prevalent 
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mentions of time-related concepts. Thus, temporality may be important in fostering future- 
oriented and agent-focused orientations toward robots. Playful interactions could be an 
effective gateway for promoting self-motivated engagement with social robots, which might 
eventually lead to long-term acceptance. The greater prevalence of time-related notions 
in perceived play interactions suggests that—although all three forms were inherently 
cooperative—something about the nature of play may promote shifts in robots’ perceived 
social status. This could be a function of shifting from belonging to an ontological outgroup 
(i.e., robot, not human; Guzman, 2020) to becoming a teammate in an autotelic activity 
and, thus, member of an ingroup (Fraune et al., 2017). It is unclear whether competitive, 
playful interactions would result in an opposite effect—a potential that should be explored 
further. The prevalence of temporality notions in post-play reflections may also be indic-
ative of a shifted experiential frame. Even though playful activity may have not resulted in 
different post-hoc evaluations, participants perceived Ray differently (i.e., more favorably) 
during playful interactions. That is, they may have entered a “magic circle”—a playful space 
in which rules, norms, and realities are held apart from everyday life (Consalvo, 2009b)—
together with a robot, where the frame shift made the robot’s ontological class irrelevant 
to the interaction. Play may thus foster non-conscious, in situ attitudinal and behavioral 
changes that become noticeable after time has passed and they have left the circle. 
Limitations and Future Directions
This investigation has inherent limitations that should be addressed in future research, 
inclusive of the missing data challenge that necessitates replication. Despite evidence that 
different interaction forms would likely make distinct features of robots-as-agents salient to 
humans, adherence to forms’ fuzzy-set criteria may have been too subtle. By experimentally 
controlling agent behaviors, content, structure, and context, we may have inadvertently 
controlled form-features that influence social judgments. The purposefully neutral content 
(triangles) may not have been sufficiently meaningful, and the laboratory environment evi-
dently fostered perceptions of tasked interaction. Varying the physical and social context 
may mitigate this challenge. Said another way, interaction forms may matter for mind and 
morality, but their prototypicality may need to be closer to 1 than to 0. Even at the expense 
of ecological validity, future research may benefit from implementing highly prototypical 
interaction forms in order to first gain coarse-grained insights into form dynamics before 
engaging more detailed inquiries.
It is also likely that the novelty and constrained structure of the interaction (i.e., five 
minutes) influenced findings. Different patterns may emerge in longer interactions and also 
as a function of the robot’s morphology. The use of an anthropomorphic robot was based 
on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically, evidence indicates it is more likely 
that people transfer humanlike representations to humanoid agents (cf. Epley et al., 2007) 
such that if differences emerged, they were more likely to be detectable for an android; prac-
tically, a humanoid robot allowed us to engage participants in more convincing and elab-
orated scenarios, reducing the risk of shallow interactions. Nevertheless, future inquiries 
should investigate how morphological cues may promote relatively different expectations 
for each interaction form: mechanomorphic robots may be suitable for task interactions 
(due to expectations of a goal-relevant design), zoomorphic robots for playful interaction 
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(due to expectations of fantasy and frivolity), and anthropomorphic robots for social inter-
actions (due to expectations of shared experiences). 
From these findings, there are also nuances to be explored pertaining to all six feature 
clusters of interaction forms. For instance, regarding agents, the convenience sample of pre-
dominantly young, White college students may have impacted findings as young people are 
often more enthusiastic toward novel technologies (Hauk et al., 2018) than are older adults 
commonly exposed to robots in clinical contexts. Additionally, the lab setting may allow for 
sufficient control of contextual factors but at the cost of everyday influences like noise and 
ambiance. Moreover, we have argued for a tentative set of feature-clusters but there may be 
other clusters inherent to interaction forms that advance the theoretical and practical utility 
of the framework. It may also be that discrete feature-sets are differently impactful than the 
ways in which interaction-form features co-occur or impact one another, as when a context 
may influence the norms. Future work should unpack the relational potentials for interac-
tion forms and their constitutive features to impact human-machine communication.
Conclusion
Data indicate prototypical task interactions are most impactful in fostering functional trust 
while the perception of interactions as social and playful foster anticipatory and moral 
trustworthiness; playful engagements also make one’s attitudes (and attitude shifts) salient 
over time. Findings are interpreted to suggest that schema-aligned task interactions and 
perceived playfulness are gateways for building trust in robots. We also interpret these find-
ings as offering initial evidence that higher-order interaction forms serve as a meaningful 
framework for considering human-machine relations, as social technological agents are 
increasingly integrated into human social spheres. 
Acknowlegements
The authors gratefully acknowledge Luis Meade and Maria Axelrad for their assistance in 
data collection, and Kristina McCravey for technical and logistical support.
Author Biographies
Jaime Banks (PhD, Colorado State University, USA) is Associate Professor in the College of 
Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Her research is animated by questions 
about human-technology relations, especially for social robots and video game avatars and 
especially for perceptions of machine mind and morality. Her current work is funded by the 
U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research.
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7598-4337
Kevin Koban (PhD, Chemnitz University of Technology, Germany) is a postdoctoral 
researcher at the Department of Communication of the University of Vienna. His research 
addresses various dynamics and effects of interactive media/technology use, including 
engagements with social media, video games, and machine agents. His current work focuses 
on the science of well-being and individuals’ interaction with digital systems.   
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9275-9270
98 Human-Machine Communication 
Philippe de V. Chauveau (MA, University of Cincinnati, USA) is a doctoral student in the 
College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. His research is focused on 




Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. American Psychologist, 
36(7), 715–729. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.36.7.715
Altman, I., & Taylor, D. A. (1973). Social penetration. The development of interpersonal rela-
tionships. Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in the self scale and the 
structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 
596–612. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596
Avramova, Y. R., & Inbar, Y. (2013). Emotion and moral judgment: Emotion and moral 
judgment. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 4(2), 169–178. https://doi.
org/10.1002/wcs.1216
Banks, J. (2017, Oct. 18–21). Toward a posthuman public: Perceived moral agency and trust 
in social machines. Association of Internet Researchers 2017 conference, Tartu, Estonia.
Banks, J. (2019). A perceived moral agency scale: Development and validation of a metric 
for humans and social machines. Computers in Human Behavior, 90, 363–371. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.08.028
Banks, J. (2020a). Optimus primed: Media cultivation of robot mental models and social 
judgments. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 7, 62. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2020.00062
Banks, J. (2020b). Theory of mind in social robots: Replication of five established human 
tests. International Journal of Social Robotics, 12(2), 403–414. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12369-019-00588-x
Banks, J., & Edwards, A. (2019). A common social distance scale for robots and humans. 
2019 28th IEEE International Conference on Robot and Human Interactive Communica-
tion (RO-MAN), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/RO-MAN46459.2019.8956316
Barnett, L. A. (2007). The nature of playfulness in young adults. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 43(4), 949–958. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2007.02.018
Bartneck, C., Kulić, D., Croft, E., & Zoghbi, S. (2009). Measurement instruments for the 
anthropomorphism, animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence, and perceived safety 
of robots. International Journal of Social Robotics, 1(1), 71–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12369-008-0001-3
Bolton, M. L. (2015). Model checking human–human communication protocols using task 
models and miscommunication generation. Journal of Aerospace Information Systems, 
12(7), 476–489. https://doi.org/10.2514/1.I010276
Bowman, N. D. (2017). The importance of effect size reporting in communication research 
reports. Communication Research Reports, 34(3), 187–190. https://doi.org/10.1080/088
24096.2017.1353338
Banks, Koban, and Chauveau 99
Boyan, A., & Banks, J. (2018). Rules & mechanics: Parameters for interactivity. In J. Banks, 
Avatar, Assembled. The Social and Technical Anatomy of Digital Bodies (pp. 159–167). 
Peter Lang.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1977). Toward an experimental ecology of human development. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 32(7), 513–531. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.32.7.513
Burke, R. (1971). “Work” and “Play.” Ethics, 82(1), 33–47.
Burr, C., Cristianini, N., & Ladyman, J. (2018). An analysis of the interaction between intel-
ligent software agents and human users. Minds and Machines, 28(4), 735–774. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11023-018-9479-0
Cave, S., Coughlan, K., & Dihal, K. (2019). “Scary robots”: Examining public responses to 
AI. Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, 331–337. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3306618.3314232
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust propensity: 
A meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 92(4), 909–927. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.909
Consalvo, M. (2009a). Cheating: Gaining advantage in videogames. MIT Press.
Consalvo, M. (2009b). There is no magic circle. Games and Culture, 4, 408–417. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1555412009343575 
Cummings, J. N., & Kiesler, S. (2008). Who collaborates successfully? Prior experience 
reduces collaboration barriers in distributed interdisciplinary research. Proceedings of 
the ACM 2008 Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work - CSCW ’08, 437. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1460563.1460633
Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioral Science, 2(3), 201–215. https://doi.
org/10.1002/bs.3830020303
Deterding, S. (2018). Alibis for adult play: A Goffmanian account of escaping embarrassment 
in adult play. Games and Culture, 13, 260–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/1555412017721086
Dragan, A., Holladay, R., & Srinivasa, S. (2014, July 12). An analysis of deceptive robot 
motion. Robotics: Science and Systems X. https://doi.org/10.15607/RSS.2014.X.010
Duffy, B. R. (2003). Anthropomorphism and the social robot. Robotics and Autonomous 
Systems, 42(3–4), 177–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0921-8890(02)00374-3
Edwards, C., Edwards, A., Spence, P. R., & Westerman, D. (2016). Initial interaction expec-
tations with robots: Testing the human-to-human interaction script. Communication 
Studies, 67(2), 227–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2015.1121899
Epley, N., Waytz, A., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2007). On seeing human: A three-factor theory 
of anthropomorphism. Psychological Review, 114(4), 864–886. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 
0033-295X.114.4.864
Foucault, M. (1986). Of other spaces. Diacritics, 16(1), 22. https://doi.org/10.2307/464648
Frasca, G. (2007). Play the message: Play, game and videogame rhetoric. Unpublished doc-
toral dissertation. IT University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Fraune, M. R., Sabanovic, S., & Smith, E. R. (2017). Teammates first: Favoring ingroup 
robots over outgroup humans. 2017 26th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and 
Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN), 1432–1437. https://doi.org/10.1109/
ROMAN.2017.8172492
100 Human-Machine Communication 
Frissen, V., Lammes, S., de Lange, M., de Mul, J., & Raessens, J. (2015). Homo ludens 2.0: 
Play, media, and identity. In Playful identities. The ludification of digital media cultures 
(pp. 9–50). Amsterdam University Press.
Gilboa, A., & Marlatte, H. (2017). Neurobiology of schemas and schema-mediated memory. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(8), 618–631. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.04.013
Goffman, E. (1964). The neglected situation. American Anthropologist, 66(6), 133–136.
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harper & 
Row.
Grizzard, M., Fitzgerald, K., Francemone, C. J., Ahn, C., Huang, J., Walton, J., McAllister, 
C., & Eden, A. (2020). Validating the extended character morality questionnaire. Media 
Psychology, 23(1), 107–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2019.1572523 
Guzman, A. L. (2020). Ontological boundaries between humans and computers and the 
implications for human-machine communication. Human-Machine Communication, 
1, 37–54. https://doi.org/10.30658/hmc.1.3 
Hauk, N., Hüffmeier, J., & Krumm, S. (2018). Ready to be a silver surfer? A meta-analysis 
on the relationship between chronological age and technology acceptance. Computers 
in Human Behavior, 84, 304–319. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.01.020
Homans, G. C. (1961). Social behavior: Its elementary forms. Harcourt, Brace and World.
Huizinga, J. (1949). Homo ludens: A study of the play-element in culture. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul.
InkKit. (2018). DeRu. Zurich, Switzerland. http://www.deru.ch/
Juul, J. (2005). Half-real: Video games between real rules and fictional worlds. MIT Press.
Kim, Y., Kwak, S. S., & Kim, M. (2013). Am I acceptable to you? Effect of a robot’s verbal 
language forms on people’s social distance from robots. Computers in Human Behavior, 
29(3), 1091–1101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2012.10.001
Komatsu, T., Kurosawa, R., & Yamada, S. (2012). How does the difference between users’ 
expectations and perceptions about a robotic agent affect their behavior? International 
Journal of Social Robotics, 4(2), 109–116. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12369-011-0122-y
Krippendorff, K. (2011). Agreement and information in the reliability of coding. Commu-
nication Methods and Measures, 5(2), 93–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2011.5
68376
Kurth, S. B. (1970). Friendships and friendly relations. In G. J. McCall, M. M. McCall, 
N. K. Denzin, G. D. Suttles, & S. B. Kurth (Eds.), Friendship as a social institution (pp. 
136–170). Transaction Publishers.
Kwon, M., Jung, M. F., & Knepper, R. A. (2016). Human expectations of social robots. 2016 
11th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), 463–464. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2016.7451807
Lapinski, M. K., & Rimal, R. N. (2005). An explication of social norms. Communication 
Theory, 15(2), 127–147. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2005.tb00329.x
Lasswell, H. D. (1948). The structure and function of communication in society. In 
L. Bryson (Ed.), The communication of ideas: A series of addresses (pp. 37–51). Harpers 
and Brothers.
Lohse, M. (2011). Bridging the gap between users’ expectations and system evaluations. 
2011 RO-MAN, 485–490. https://doi.org/10.1109/ROMAN.2011.6005252
Banks, Koban, and Chauveau 101
Malle, B. F. (2019). How many dimensions of mind perception really are there? In A. K. 
Goel, C. M. Seifert, & C. Freksa (Eds.), Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the 
Cognitive Science Society (pp. 2268–2274). Cognitive Science Society.
Martelaro, N., Nneji, V. C., Ju, W., & Hinds, P. (2016). Tell me more designing HRI to 
encourage more trust, disclosure, and companionship. 2016 11th ACM/IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), 181–188. https://doi.org/10.1109/
HRI.2016.7451750
Martínez-Córcoles, M., Teichmann, M., & Murdvee, M. (2017). Assessing technophobia 
and technophilia: Development and validation of a questionnaire. Technology in Soci-
ety, 51, 183–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2017.09.007
Mäyrä, F. (2012). Playful mobile communication: Services supporting the culture of play. 
Interactions: Studies in Communication & Culture, 3(1), 55–70. https://doi.org/10.1386/
iscc.3.1.55_1
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., & Trouard, T. (2001). A functional imaging 
study of cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 98(20), 11832–11835. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.211415698
Mehl, M. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2003). The sounds of social life: A psychometric analysis 
of students’ daily social environments and natural conversations. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 84(4), 857–870. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.857
Mele, V. (2017). Social interaction. In B. S. Turner (Ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Social Theory (pp. 1–4). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118430873.
est0811
Moll, J., De Oliveira-Souza, R., & Zahn, R. (2008). The neural basis of moral cognition: 
Sentiments, concepts, and values. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 
161–180. https://doi.org/10.1196/annals.1440.005
Moon, J.-W., & Kim, Y.-G. (2001). Extending the TAM for a World-Wide-Web context. Infor-
mation & Management, 38(4), 217–230. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-7206(00)00061-6
Nedungadi, P., & Hutchinson, J. W. (1985). The prototypicality of brands: Relationships with 
brand awareness, preference and usage. Advances in Consumer Research, 12, 498–503.
Oldenburg, R. (2007). The character of third places. In M. Carmona & S. Tiesdell (Eds.), 
Urban design reader (pp. 163–169). Architectural Press.
Oliver, M. B., Bowman, N. D., Woolley, J. K., Rogers, R., Sherrick, B. I., & Chung, M.-Y. 
(2015). Video games as meaningful entertainment experiences. Psychology of Popular 
Media Culture. https://doi.org/10.1037/ppm0000066
Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2006). Alignment as the basis for successful communica-
tion. Research on Language and Computation, 4(2–3), 203–228. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11168-006-9004-0
Poole, M. S. (1978). An information-task approach to organizational communication. Acad-
emy of Management Review, 3(3), 493–504. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1978.4305740
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behav-
ioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512
Ragin, C. C. (2000). Fuzzy-set social science. University of Chicago Press.
Rogers, R., Woolley, J., Sherrick, B., Bowman, N. D., & Oliver, M. B. (2017). Fun versus 
meaningful video game experiences: A qualitative analysis of user responses. The Com-
puter Games Journal, 6(1–2), 63–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40869-016-0029-9
102 Human-Machine Communication 
Rosch, E. H. (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories. In 
T. E. Moore (Ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of language (pp. 111–144). 
Academic Press.
Rubin, Z., & Shenker, S. (1978). Friendship, proximity, and self-disclosure. Journal of Per-
sonality, 46(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1978.tb00599.x
Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Agenda-setting, priming, and framing revisited: Another look at 
cognitive effects of political communication. Mass Communication & Society, 3, 297–
316. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07
Sherwood, A. L., & DePaolo, C. A. (2005). Task and relationship-oriented trust in lead-
ers. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 12(2), 65–81. https://doi.
org/10.1177/107179190501200206
Simmel, G. (1950). The sociology of Georg Simmel (K. H. Wolff, Ed., Trans.). Free Press. 
(Original work published 1908).
Simmel, G. (1990). The philosophy of money (D. Frisby, K. Mengelberg, T. B. Bottomore, 
Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1900).
Sundar, S. S. (2008). The MAIN model: A heuristic approach to understanding technology 
effects on credibility. In M. J. Metzger & A. J. Flanagan (Eds.), Digital media, youth, and 
credibility (pp. 73–100). MIT Press.
Taboada, M., & Wiesemann, L. (2010). Subjects and topics in conversation. Journal of Prag-
matics, 42(7), 1816–1828. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2009.04.009
Takayama, L., Ju, W., & Nass, C. (2008). Beyond dirty, dangerous and dull: What every-
day people think robots should do. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on 
Human Robot Interaction - HRI ’08, 25. https://doi.org/10.1145/1349822.1349827
Tamborini, R., Eden, A., Bowman, N. D., Grizzard, M., Weber, R., & Lewis, R. J. (2013). Pre-
dicting media appeal from instinctive moral values. Mass Communication and Society, 
16(3), 325–346. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2012.703285
Teh, A., Baniassad, E., van Rooy, D., & Boughton, C. (2012). Social psychology and software 
teams: Establishing task-effective group norms. IEEE Software, 29(4), 53–58. https://
doi.org/10.1109/MS.2011.157
Ullman, D., & Malle, B. F. (2018). What does it mean to trust a robot?: Steps toward a 
multidimensional measure of trust. Companion of the 2018 ACM/IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Human-Robot Interaction—HRI ’18, 263–264. https://doi.org/ 
10.1145/3173386.3176991
Ullman, D., & Malle, B. F. (2019). Measuring gains and losses in human-robot trust: Evidence 
for differentiable components of trust. 2019 14th ACM/IEEE International Conference 
on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI), 618–619. https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2019.8673154
Van den Brule, R., Dotsch, R., Bijlstra, G., Wigboldus, D. H. J., & Haselager, P. (2014). Do 
robot performance and behavioral style affect human trust?: A multi-method approach. 
International Journal of Social Robotics, 6(4), 519–531. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
s12369-014-0231-5
Vanneste, B. S., Puranam, P., & Kretschmer, T. (2014). Trust over time in exchange relation-
ships: Meta-analysis and theory: Research Notes and Commentaries. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 35(12), 1891–1902. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2198
Banks, Koban, and Chauveau 103
Wageman, R., & Baker, G. (1997). Incentives and cooperation: The joint effects of task and 
reward interdependence on group performance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 
18(2), 139–158.
Walliser, J. C., de Visser, E. J., Wiese, E., & Shaw, T. H. (2019). Team structure and team building 
improve human–machine teaming with autonomous agents. Journal of Cognitive Engi-
neering and Decision Making, 13(4), 258–278. https://doi.org/10.1177/1555343419867563
Weiss, R. S., & Kahn, R. L. (1960). Definitions of work and occupation. Social Problems, 8, 
142–150.
Zillmann, D., & Cantor, J. R. (1976). A disposition theory of humour and mirth. In A. J. 
Chapman & H. C. Foot (Eds.), Humor and laughter: Theory, research, and applications 
(pp. 93–115). Transaction Publishers. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203789469-6
Center for Open  Science 
This article has earned the Center for Open Science badges for Open Data and Open Mate-
rials through Open Practices Disclosure. The authors have made their data and 
materials freely accessible at https://osf.io/n87bg

